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General Equilibrium, Electricity Generation Technologies and
the Cost of Carbon Abatement
Bruno Lanz* and Sebastian Rausch†
Abstract
Electricity generation is a major contributor to carbon dioxide emissions, and a key determinant of abate-
ment costs. Ex-ante assessments of carbon policies mainly rely on either of two modeling paradigms:
(i) partial equilibrium models of the electricity sector that use bottom-up engineering data on generation
technology costs, and (ii) multi-sector general equilibrium models that represent economic activities with
smooth top-down aggregate production functions. In this paper, we examine the structural assumptions of
these numerical techniques using a suite of models sharing common technological features and calibrated
to the same benchmark data. First, our analysis provides evidence that general equilibrium effects of an
economy-wide carbon policy are of first-order importance to assess abatement potentials and price changes
in the electricity sector, suggesting that the parametrization of Marshallian demand in a partial equilibrium
setting is problematic. Second, we find that top-down technology representations produce fuel substitution
patterns that are inconsistent with bottom-up cost data, mainly because of difficulties in capturing the
temporal and discrete nature of electricity generation by means of aggregate substitution elasticities. Our
analysis highlights the difficulty to parameterize numerical models used for policy projections, and suggests
that the integration of a bottom-up electricity sector model into a general equilibrium framework provides
an attractive structural alternative for ex-ante policy modeling.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Electricity generation is a significant contributor to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, and
potentially has an important role in abatement efforts. The current research paradigm for ex-ante
carbon policy assessment mainly involves two classes of models (Hourcade et al., 2006, e.g.,). On
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the one hand, technology-rich ‘bottom-up’ models provide a detailed representation of generation
technologies and the overall electricity system. By construction, these models are partial
equilibrium, and typically include no or very limited interactions with the macroeconomic system.
On the other hand, economy-wide ‘top-down’ models represent sectoral economic activities and
electricity generation technologies through aggregate production functions. While these models
are designed to incorporate general equilibrium effects, smooth aggregate production functions
are not well suited to capture the temporal and discrete nature of technology choice.1
Given the shortcomings of each model class, the integration of bottom-up technology
representation and economy-wide interactions is the subject of a large literature. In so-called
‘hybrid’ models, the combination of the two models either fail to achieve overall consistency
(Hofman and Jorgenson, 1976; Hogan and Weyant, 1982; Drouet et al., 2005; Jacoby and
Scha¨fer, 2006), or complement one type of model with a ‘reduced-form’ representation of the
other, thereby lacking structural explicitness (Messner and Schrattenholzer, 2000; Bosetti et al.,
2006; Manne et al., 2006; Strachan and Kannan, 2008). An alternative and more recent approach
is to directly embed a set of discrete generation technologies into a top-down model (Sue Wing,
2006; Boehringer and Rutherford, 2008). Under this approach, however, the representation of
technological detail significantly increases the dimensionality of the model, thus severely
constraining large-scale applications. Finally, a decomposition algorithm by Boehringer and
Rutherford (2009) employs an iterative solution procedure between the top-down and bottom-up
model components, overcoming issues of dimensionality and model complexity. This approach
has been successfully implemented in Sugandha et al. (2009). Despite the large literature
documenting efforts to reconcile top-down and bottom-up modeling paradigms, there is no
quantitative evidence on the relative merits of either of the two approaches or on the benefits of
model integration.
The objective of this paper is to examine the implications of top-down and bottom-up
modeling approaches for the assessment of economy-wide carbon policies, and explore the
sensitivity to different structural assumptions concerning electricity supply and demand. As it is
impossible to derive general qualitative propositions for such an issue, we employ a suite of
numerical partial equilibrium (PE) and general equilibrium (GE) models that share common
technological features and are calibrated to the same benchmark equilibrium. Our benchmark
model consistently integrates a bottom-up technology representation of the electricity sector
within a general equilibrium setting based on the decomposition method by Boehringer and
Rutherford (2009). The economy-wide component is based on a static version of the MIT
U.S. Regional Energy Policy (USREP) model, a multi-sector multi-region numerical general
equilibrium model designed to analyze climate and energy policy in the U.S. (Rausch et al.,
2010a, 2010b). Electricity production is represented by a multi-region load-dispatch model based
1 Another issue with top-down representations of the electricity sector is the violation of basic energy conservation
principles away from the benchmark calibration point (see Sue Wing, 2008).
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on a comprehensive database of electric generators from the Energy Information Administration
(EIA, 2007a), and features detailed plant-level information on the generation costs and capacity,
fuel switching capabilities, and season-specific load profiles.2
Our results are as follows. First, we find that general equilibrium income and substitution
effects induced by an economy-wide carbon policy are of first-order importance to evaluate the
response of the electricity sector, as changes in electricity prices and abatement potentials are
largely driven by both the slope and the location of the demand schedule. Following the
suggestion in an early and influential article by Hogan and Manne (1977), we explore whether
price elasticities of electricity demand simulated from a GE model can approximate general
equilibrium effects in a partial equilibrium setting. However, we find that such a modeling
strategy is not sufficient to approximate the results one would get with an integrated model. For
example, we calculate that general equilibrium effects mitigate electricity price increases by up to
20% in the case of even moderate carbon prices of around $25 to $50 per metric ton of CO2.
Our second set of results relates to the representation of electricity generation technologies in
general equilibrium top-down models. Our analysis suggests that top-down technology
representations produce fuel substitution patterns that are inconsistent with bottom-up cost data,
mainly because of difficulties to capture the temporal and discrete nature of electricity generation
by means of aggregate substitution elasticities. In addition, top-down representation of electricity
markets imply that the price of electricity reflects the total carbon content of generation. This
contrasts with real markets (and the bottom-up approach), where the carbon price is reflected in
the electricity price through the carbon content of the marginal producer at a given point in time
(Stavins, 2008). We quantify these differences by implementing two widely adopted top-down
technology specifications based on nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions
(Paltsev et al., 2009; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996). We find that on the national level structural
assumptions about the technology representation translate into welfare costs estimates that differ
by as much as 60% for an emissions reduction target of 20%. Regional discrepancies are of the
same order of magnitude depending on the initial stock of electric generation technologies.
On a more general level, our findings demonstrate the significance of structural assumptions
embedded in top-down and bottom-up modeling approaches for the assessment of carbon and
energy policies. Our analysis is thus beneficial to modelers and those who make use of model
results as it contributes to an improved understanding of the theoretical and methodological basis
for carbon policy assessment with large-scale simulation models. Moreover, we argue that an
integrated approach that overcomes limitations inherent in each modeling paradigm can provide a
2 One major advantage of an integrated approach is the possibility to represent highly detailed assumptions about the
market structure in the electricity sector while still capturing general equilibrium effects. In a companion paper
(Lanz and Rausch, 2011), we incorporate cost-of-service regulation at the operator level and imperfect competition
in wholesale markets to investigate the implications of market structure for the design of carbon pricing policies. To
facilitate the comparison of top-down and bottom-up approaches, the present analysis, however, assumes marginal
cost-pricing and perfect competition in the electricity sector.
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fruitful avenue for enhancing tools for policy analysis.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
economy-wide model and describes the top-down and bottom-up representation of the electric
power sector. Section 3 describes the integrated economic-electricity model and issues related to
the implementation of the integration algorithm. Section 4 investigates the importance of general
equilibrium factors and the implications of top-down versus bottom-up technology representation
for carbon policy assessment. Section 5 concludes.
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This section presents the different components of our numerical modeling framework. We first
provide an overview of the economy-wide model, and then describe the top-down and bottom-up
models of electric generation technologies.
2.1 The U.S. Regional Energy Policy Model
The economy-wide model is based on a static version of the MIT U.S. Regional Energy Policy
model (Rausch et al., 2010a,b), a multi-region and multi-sector general equilibrium model for the
U.S. economy. USREP is designed to assess the impacts of energy and GHG control policies on
regions, sectors and industries, and different household income classes. It is built on state-level
data for the year 2006 that combines economic Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) data from from
the IMPLAN data set (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, 2008) with physical energy and price data
from the State Energy Data System (EIA, 2009b). The model is written in the GAMS software
system, formulated with the MPSGE modeling language (Rutherford, 1995, 1999) and solved
with the PATH solver (Dirkse and Ferris, 1995) for mixed complementarity problems (MCP). As
a detailed description of the model is provided in Rausch et al. (2010b), including a full algebraic
characterization of equilibrium conditions, we here only give a brief overview of key model
features.
The structure of the model is summarized in Table 1. Much of the sectoral detail in the
USREP model is focused on providing a more accurate representation of energy production and
use as it may change under policies that would limit greenhouse gas emissions. Here we group
economic sectors as either energy demand sectors or energy supply and conversion sectors.
Energy demand sectors include five industrial and three final demand sectors. Each industrial
sector interacts with the rest of the economy through an input-output structure, where each sector
uses outputs from other sectors, and its output is then used by other sectors, for final demand or is
exported. The energy sector encompasses fossil energy production, as well as electricity
production (including generation, transmission and distribution activities). Energy supply and
conversion sectors are modeled in enough detail to identify fuels and technologies with different
CO2 emissions. The model describes production and consumption sectors as nested Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production functions (or the Cobb-Douglas and Leontief special
cases of the CES). The nesting structure and parametrization for each production and
consumption activity is described in detail in Rausch et al. (2010a).
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Table 1. USREP Model Details.
Sectors Regionsa Production Factors
Industrial sectors California ISO (CA) Capital
Agriculture (AGR) Northwest Power Pool (NWPP) Labor
Services (SRV) Mountain Power Area (MOUNT) Resource factors
Energy-intensive products (EIS) Texas (ERCOT) Coal
Other industries products (OTH) Southwest Power Pool (SPP) Natural gas
Transportation (TRN) Midwest ISO (MISO) Crude oil
Final demand sectors Southeast Power Pool (SEAST) Hydro
Household demand PJM Interconnection (PJM) Nuclear
Government demand New York ISO (NY) Land
Investment demand New England ISO (NENGL)
Energy supply and conversion
Fuels production
Coal (COL)
Natural gas (GAS)
Crude oil (CRU)
Refined oil (OIL)
Electric generation, transmission
and distribution
Notes: aSpecific detail on regional grouping is provided in Figure 1.
A single representative household in each region is endowed with labor, capital, and
industry-specific natural resources. The government is modeled as a passive entity which collects
taxes and spends revenue on goods and transfers to households. Tax rates are differentiated by
region and sector, and include both federal and state taxes.3 The demand for investment is driven
by savings, which enter directly into the utility function and makes the consumption-investment
decision endogenous.
The regional structure of the model is based on the geographical segmentation of electric
power markets. This segmentation is mainly driven by available transmission capacity and by the
evolving regulatory status of the electricity sector (Joskow, 2005).4 We approximate the
geographical structure of electricity markets by grouping states into ten regions. The resulting
regional aggregation is shown in Figure 1, and region acronyms are listed in Table 1. Labor is
assumed to be fully mobile across industries in a given region but is immobile across U.S.
regions, while capital is mobile across regions and industries.
3 The USREP model includes ad-valorem output taxes, corporate capital income taxes, and payroll taxes (employers’
and employees’ contribution). In addition, IMPLAN data has been augmented by incorporating tax data from the
NBER TAXSIM tax simulator to represent marginal personal income taxes. The detailed representation of taxes
captures the effects of tax-base erosion following a GHG pricing policy.
4 Figure A1 in Appendix A provides a current map of integrated electricity markets.
5
Figure 1. Regions in the Integrated Economic-Electricity Model.
All goods represented in the model are tradable and, depending on the type of commodity, we
distinguish three different representations of intra-national regional trade. First, bilateral flows for
all non-energy goods are represented as Armington goods (Armington, 1969), where like goods
from other regions are imperfectly substitutable for domestically produced goods. Second,
domestically traded energy goods, except for electricity, are assumed to be homogeneous
products, i.e. there is a national pool that demands domestic exports and supplies domestic
imports. This assumption reflects the high degree of integration of intra-U.S. markets for natural
gas, crude and refined oil, and coal. Third, we differentiate three regional electricity pools that are
designed to provide an approximation of the three asynchronous interconnects in the U.S.: the
Eastern Interconnection, Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), and the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).5 We assume that within each regional pool traded
electricity is a homogeneous good.
Foreign closure of the model is determined through a national balance-of-payments (BOP)
constraint. Hence, the total value of U.S. exports equals the total value of U.S. imports accounting
for an initial BOP deficit given by 2006 statistics. The BOP constraint thereby determines the real
exchange rate which indicates the endogenous value of the domestic currency vis-a-vis the
foreign currency. The U.S. economy as a whole is modeled as a large open economy by
specifying elasticities for world export demand and world import supply functions. Thus, while
5 In terms of the regional aggregation described in Figure 1, the Eastern Interconnection thus comprises SPP, MISO,
SEAST, PJM, NY, and NENGL, and the WECC comprises CA, NWPP, and MOUNT.
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we do not explicitly model other regions, the simulations include terms of trade and
competitiveness effects of policies that approximate results we would get with a global model.
2.2 Top-Down Modeling of the Electricity Sector
The top-down approach for modeling electricity generation in energy-environment general
equilibrium models typically involves a representative firm in each region chooses a
profit-maximizing level of output. In our setting, production technologies involve energy (E),
capital (K), labor (L), and material inputs (Mj) from other sectors indexed by
j ∈ {Agriculture, Services, Energy-Intensive, Other Industries, Transportation}, subject to
technological, institutional and resource constraints. Production technologies are described by
nested CES production function, and markets are competitive. In the following, we describe the
representation of the nesting structure and lay out equilibrium conditions for electricity
generation. The nesting structure that we adopt and values for the free elasticity parameters are
provided in Figure 2 and Table 2, respectively.
K L
KL
E M
EM
Ez Mj
KL E
KLE M
COL-
OIL
K L GAS
COL OIL
Mj
(a) (b)
Conventional Fossil
Generation
sVA
sVA
K    L
NR KL
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Nuclear Hydro
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sEMsMsKLE
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sE sM
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K LMj
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sTR
Electricity
Figure 2. Top-Down Production Structure of Electricity Sector.
Electricity for end-use demand combines electricity generated with Transmission &
Distribution services, which themselves are a CES composite of capital, labor, and material
inputs. Electric current from different sources is modeled as a homogeneous commodity (as
indicated by an infinite elasticity of substitution in the nest labeled Generation), and production
from Conventional Fossil, Nuclear, and Hydro is resolved at the sub-sector level to separately
identify inputs and outputs, and to reflect the characteristics of each technology. Electricity
produced from nuclear and hydro power relies on capital and labor, and a technology- and
region-specific resource factor (NR and HR) that is assumed to be in fixed supply. The elasticity
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Table 2. Elasticity Parameters for Top-down Representation of Electricity Sector.
Parameter Description Valuea
(a) (b)
Elasticity of substitution
σKLEM Capital-labor and energy-materials bundle 0 0.70
σKLE Energy and value-added 0.40 –
σE Energy inputs – 0.97
σM Material inputs 0 0.60
σEM Energy and materials bundle – 0.70
σG Coal/oil and natural Gas 1.00 –
σC Coal and oil 0.30 –
σGT Generation and transmission & distribution 0 0
σTR Inputs in transmission & distribution bundle 0 0
σVA Capital and labor 1.00 1.00
Elasticity of supply
ηNR Nuclear resource 0.25 0.25
ηHR Hydro resource 0.50 0.50
Notes: aValues shown in columns (a) and (b) refer to elasticity parameters used on the nesting structure shown in Panel
(a) and (b) in Table 2, and are taken from the MIT EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 2009) and Bovenberg and Goulder
(1996), respectively.
of substitution between the resource factor and value-added bundle is calibrated to match
observed price elasticities of supply reported in Table 2.6
For fossil-based electricity, we implement two different nesting structures widely that are
adopted in the literature. The nesting structure labeled (a) in Figure 2 is in line with Rausch et
al. (2010b), Paltsev et al. (2009) and Boehringer et al. (2010). The nesting structure labeled (b) is
based on Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), and has been used for policy analysis in Sue Wing
(2006). Elasticities values for each nesting structure are shown in Table 2, and are taken from the
MIT EPPA model (Paltsev et al., 2009) and Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), respectively.
Under the nesting structure (a) electricity produced from fossil fuels combines materials and a
capital-labor-energy composite in a Leontief nest (σKLEM = 0). Generation from coal, oil, and
gas technologies are not represented separately but are instead treated via substitution between
fuels. This has the implication of limiting the substitution possibilities among fuels, thus
representing their unique value for peaking, intermediate, and base load. For example, even if gas
6 Following Rutherford (1998), the elasticity of substitution between value-added and the resource factor in the nuclear
sector can be calibrated according to σNR = ηNR θn1−θn where θn is the value share of resource costs. A similar
formula is used to calibrate σHR, the elasticity of substitution between value-added and the resource factor in the
hydro sector.
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generation becomes much more expensive than coal or nuclear, this structure will tend to preserve
its use. This is consistent with gas technology being adequate for peak load supply, since building
capacity of nuclear and coal for peak demand would mean large amounts of capital would be idle
much of the time.
The nesting structure (b) follows the same logic but allows for direct substitution between all
fossil fuels (Ez, z = {Coal, Oil, Natural Gas}). Moreover, the value added bundle here trades off
with an energy-materials composite whereas under the nesting structure (a) capital-labor can be
substituted directly for composite energy. A key difference between both structures is that (b)
allows for a higher degree of substitutability between materials M and energy E, i.e. σEM > 0,
whereas under (a) materials enter in fixed proportions, i.e. σKLEM = 0. This implies that if energy
prices rise relative to material costs, generation costs will be higher under structure (a) compared
to (b).
Given this structure, the agent’s interactions generate a set of supply and demand schedules,
and interactions among these agents determine equilibrium values of the endogenous variables
listed in Table 3. In equilibrium, the cost minimizing behavior and the price-taking assumption
imply that zero-profit and market clearing conditions exhibit complementary slackness with
respect to activity levels and market prices, respectively (Mathiesen, 1985; Rutherford, 1995).
Hence, zero-profit conditions for fossil and non-fossil electricity generation determine the
respective activity levels:7
−Π NF ≥ 0 ⊥ ELENF ≥ 0 (1)
−Π F ≥ 0 ⊥ ELEF ≥ 0 (2)
where Π NF and Π F denotes the unit profit function for each type of generation technology, and the
⊥ operator indicates the complementary relationship between an equilibrium condition and the
associated variable.
Unit profit functions for electricity generation from non-fossil fuel sources, indexed by
NF = {Nuclear, Hydro}, can be derived based on the dual cost minimization problem of
individual producers. Given the CES nesting structure reported in Figure 2 these can be written as:
Π NF =P ELE −
(
θNF
(
PNF
θNF
)1−σNF
+(1− θNF)
[(
PK
(1− θNF)θNFK
)θNFK ( PL
(1− θNF)(1− θNFK )
)(1−θNFK )]1−σNF1/(1−σNF)
7 For notational convenience, we suppress the region index and focus on an algebraic characterization of the production
structure shown in Panel (a), Figure 2. Also, we abstract here from generation and transmission costs that are
modeled as a simple fixed coefficient (Leontief) technology.
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Table 3. Equilibrium Variables Related to Electricity in Top-Down Representation.
Activity variables
ELENF Electricity generation from non-fossil technologies
ELEF Electricity generation from fossil fuels
DELE Demand for electricity
Sj ,Dj Supply and demand for commodity j in non-electricity sectors
L , DL Labor supply and demand in non-electricity sectors
K , DK Capital supply and demand in non-electricity sectors
Sz , Dz Supply of and demand for fuel z in non-electricity sectors
SNF Supply of technology-specific resource
Price variables
P ELE Price index for electricity generation
P j Price index non-energy commodity j
P L Wage rate
PK Rental price for capital
P z Price index for fossil fuel z
PNF Price index for technology-specific resource NF
where θNF is the benchmark cost share of the fixed input in the non-fossil generation technology
and θNFK is the cost share of capital in the value-added subnest.
Using a similar notation, and given the Leontief structure in the top-nest of electricity
generation, the unit profit function for electricity generation from conventional fossil fuels is:
Π F = P ELE −
(
θKLEPKLE + (1− θKLE)
∑
j
θjP j
)
where θKLE is the benchmark cost share of the capital-labor-electricity (KLE) composite, and θj is
the benchmark cost share of commodity j. The cost of a unit of KLE is given by:
PKLE =
{
θE
(
P E
θE
)1−σKLE
+ (1− θE)
[(
PK
(1− θE)θEK
)θEK
(
PL
(1− θE)(1− θEK)
)(1−θEK)]1−σKLE
1/(1−σKLE)
where θE is the cost share of the composite fuel cost and θEK is the cost share of capital in the
value-added subnest. The unit profit function of the fossil-based generation is completed by the
composite cost-minimizing unit fuels costs:
PE =
{
θGAS
(
PGAS
θGAS
)(1−σG)
+ (1− θGAS)
[
θCOL
(
P COL
θCOL(1− θGAS)
)(1−σC)
+(1− θCOL)
(
POIL
(1− θCOL)(1− θGAS)
)(1−σC)] (1−σG)(1−σC)
1/(1−σG)
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with respective baseline cost share parameters.
For a given region, equilibrium interactions of the electricity sector with the rest of the
economy can be fully described by a set of market clearing conditions. We begin with the market
clearing condition for electricity:
ELEF +
∑
NF
ELENF = DELE ⊥ P ELE . (3)
The demand for inputs can be derived by applying the envelope theorem (Shephard’s Lemma), so
that the market clearing for non-energy commodity j is given by:
Sj = Dj + ELE
F∂Π F
∂P j
⊥ P j (4)
where a variable with a bar denotes its benchmark value.
The regional labor market is in equilibrium if:
L = DL + ELE
F∂Π F
∂PL
+ ELE
NF∑
NF
∂Π NF
∂PL
⊥ PL , (5)
and the market clearance condition for capital is:∑
r
Kr =
∑
r
DKr + ELE
F
r
∂Π F
∂PK
+ ELE
NF
r
∑
NF
∂Π NF
∂PK
⊥ PK . (6)
Similarly, the market for fossil fuel z and technology-specific resources is in balance if:
Sz = Dz + ELE
F∂Π F
∂P z
⊥ P z (7)
SNF = ELE
NF∂Π NF
∂PNF
⊥ PNF . (8)
Finally, the income of the representative household is given by:
M = PKK + PLL +
∑
NF
P NFR
NF
+ TR . (9)
where M denote income and comprises revenues derived from capital, labor and natural resources
endowments, as well as government transfers (TR).
2.3 Bottom-Up Modeling of the Electricity Sector
The bottom-up approach exhibits two key differences as compared with the top-down
representation of electricity generation. First, the bottom-up model uses a cost-based description
of discrete generation technologies to determine the least-cost utilization that meets the demand,
whereas the top-down representation uses smooth (nested) CES functions where the share
parameters are calibrated to match the benchmark value market shares. Second, the bottom-up
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approach features a finer time resolution, dividing the year into load blocks to capture observed
fluctuations of the physical demand for electricity. This reflects the limited substitution
possibilities of electricity generated at two different times in the year, since neither the supply of
electricity nor the demand for electricity services can easily be shifted across time.8
Our bottom-up representation of the electricity sector, a partial equilibrium multi-region
load-dispatch model for the continental U.S., is conceptually close to a static version of a
MARKAL (MARKet ALlocation) model, a widely used normative framework for optimal
resource allocation, originally developed by the International Energy Agency (Fishbone and
Abilock, 1981). The model is based on a comprehensive data set of more than 16,000 electricity
generators that were active in 2006 (EIA Form EIA-860, 2007a) containing information on the
capacity, generation technology and energy sources. The list of generation technologies and fuels
included in the model are displayed in Table 4. Generators are characterized by a constant
marginal generation cost and maximum output in each time period.9
Marginal costs of generators include two main components. First, we use variable operation
and maintenance (O&M) costs from EIA (2009a). These costs are specific to combinations of
technology and fuel, and includes labor, capital, material and waste disposition costs per unit of
output. The second cost component is fuel specific, and contingent on generator-specific
technology, as reported in EIA (EIA Form EIA-860, 2007a), generators can use up to three
different fuels. The choice of fuel is thus endogenous, and depends on the prevailing fuel prices,
including differences in carbon intensity when a carbon price is levied on carbon emissions. We
use data on state-level fuel prices for 2006 (EIA, 2009c). The second determinant of the fuel cost
is the efficiency of the plants, which we derive by matching generators to plant level data on fuel
consumption and net electricity output (EIA Form EIA-920, 2007b).
In the benchmark, the electricity demand by region (in MWh) is directly taken from the
augmented SAM data that underlies the USREP model and that incorporates information about
physical energy quantities. We then share out the demand across three seasons (summer, winter
and fall/spring) with region-specific data (EIA Form EIA-920, 2007b), and into three load blocks
(peak, intermediate and base-load) with region and season-specific load distribution data (EIA,
2009a).
In order to keep simulations comparable across modeling frameworks, the market structure is
akin to that of the top-down representation, and in each region and time period generators are
assumed to be price-takers. The market value of electricity generated, which we refer to as the
wholesale price (net of transmission and distribution costs), varies in each region, season and load
8 First, the costs of storing electric current are essentially prohibitive, so that electricity must be produced “on demand”.
Second, the demand for electricity services varies over time through stable (although uncertain) factors, like the
hours with natural light or the weather conditions.
9 For technologies with relatively low generation costs, we impute capacity factors from data on observed output (EIA
Form EIA-920, 2007b). Indeed, technologies such as nuclear, hydro, wind and solar can be seen as “must-run”
technologies, in the sense that they are typically used at their effective capacity in each period (Bushnell et al.,
2008).
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Table 4. Generation Technologies and Fuel Mapping between Economy-wide and Electricity Sector Model.
Technologies
Combined Cycle, Combustion Turbine, Hydraulic Turbine, Internal Combustion Engine, Photovoltaic,
Steam Turbine, Wind Turbine
Fuels
Coal:
Anthracite and Bituminous Coal (BIT), Lignite Coal (LIG), Coal-based Synfuel (SC),
Sub-bituminous Coal (SUB), Waste and other Coal (WC)
Natural Gas:
Blast Furnace Gas (BFG), Natural Gas (NG), Other Gas (OG), Gaseous Propane (PG)
Oil:
Distillate Fuel Oil (DFO), Jet Fuel (JF), Kerosene (KER), Residual Fuel Oil (RFO)
Exogenous:
Agricultural Crop (AB), Other Biomass (gas, liquids, solids) (OB), Black Liquor (BLQ),
Geothermal (GEO), Landfill Gas (LFG), Municipal Solid Waste (MSW), Nuclear Fission (NUC),
Petroleum Coke (PC), Other wastes (OWH), Solar (SUN), Wood and Wood Waste (WDS),
Wind (WND), Hydroelectric (WAT)
Table 5. Equilibrium Variables Related to Electricity in Bottom-up Model.
Activity variables
eleg,zt Electricity generation for generator g, fuel z and load block t
d elet Electricity demand in load block t
d z Demand for fuel z
Price variables
pwst Wholesale price of electricity generation in load block t
pele Consumer price for electricity generation
pz Price of fuel z
µ
g
t Fixed capacity rents for generator g and load block t
block according to the generation costs of the marginal producer.
Akin to the top-down representation, the model is formulated as a MCP and we now lay out
the equilibrium conditions for the bottom-up representation of the electricity sector. Endogenous
variables are listed in Table 5, where we denote respective counterparts to the top-down
representation with corresponding lower case variables and list.10
Electricity output at each generator g and load block t exhibits complementarity slackness with
the zero profit condition:
−pi g,zt ≥ 0 ⊥ eleg,zt ≥ 0 (10)
10 As above, we omit the region index and we abstract from generation and transmission costs.
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where the unit profit function is given by:
pig,zt = p
ws
t − cg − pzγg − µgt
and where cg denotes variable O&M costs of generation and γg is a measure of the fuel
requirements per unit of output. Note here that generators able to use multiple fuels always use
their capacity at the lowest possible cost, and since fuel prices are determined on a yearly basis, it
is always optimal for producers to use only the cheapest fuel for generating electricity across all
load blocks.
The wholesale price of electricity in each load block is the complementary variable to the
market clearance equation:∑
g,z
eleg,zt = d
ele
t ⊥ pwst . (11)
In this setting, all submarginal generators earn scarcity rents µ gt measuring the value of the
installed generation capacity per unit of output. The rents are the multiplier associated with the
per period capacity constraints:
κ gt ≥
∑
z
eleg,zt ⊥ µ gt ≥ 0 (12)
where κ gt is the maximum output of generator g in a given time period.
By construction, the bottom-up model is not calibrated to a benchmark dataset, but rather
optimizes the utilization of available capacity in order to meet the electricity demand. The
benchmark output ele
g,z
t and price p
ws
t are determined by solving equations (10) through (12)
given observed demand d
ele
t and fuel prices p
z. The regional fuel mix predicted by the model (sˆz)
is reported in Table 6 and closely matches observed values (sz).11
The response of the model to a carbon policy is driven by three mechanisms. First, fuel costs
are increased according to fuel-specific CO2 emission coefficients (EIA, 2008). Second, we add
structure on the electricity demand response. Since a wide majority of electricity consumers are
charged near constant yearly retail price (despite substantial time variations on the wholesale
market), we assume that the generation costs passed forward to the consumers is an
output-weighted yearly average of the wholesale price in each load block t:
pele =
1∑
g,z,t
eleg,zt
∑
g,z,t
pwst ele
g,z
t . (13)
11 As a formal goodness of fit measure, we compute the coefficient of determination R2 = 1−
∑
i(yi−yˆi)2∑
i(yi−y¯)2 , where yi is
observed outcome, yˆi is the prediction from the model, and y¯ is average observed outcome. The R2 with respect
to the predicted output by fuel and by region yields is above 95%, and around 90% for the regional output per
generation technologies.
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Table 6. Observed (sz) and Predicted (sˆz) Fuel Mix (% of Total Regional Electricity Output).
Regions Coal Natural gas Nuclear Hydro Other
sz sˆz sz sˆz sz sˆz sz sˆz sz sˆz
CA 7.2 8.4 46.6 46.4 13.8 14.3 20.9 20.8 11.4 10.1
ERCOT 31.7 32.7 53.5 53.7 11.8 10.7 0.2 0.1 2.8 2.8
MISO 68.6 69.0 5.3 5.1 22.6 21.4 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.7
MOUNT 56.6 56.3 26.7 26.4 11.2 12.5 4.2 4.1 1.2 0.8
NENGL 14.8 15.2 39.8 40.5 27.8 27.6 7.1 6.6 10.5 10.0
NWPP 34.5 34.8 14.5 14.4 2.9 3.0 45.4 44.6 2.7 3.2
NY 14.7 14.0 29.4 31.5 29.5 29.0 19.1 18.4 7.2 7.1
PJM 64.9 63.8 6.7 6.6 25.0 23.7 1.4 1.1 2.1 4.8
SEAST 50.8 48.0 19.2 19.7 22.5 22.6 2.5 2.7 5.0 7.1
SPP 59.7 59.3 24.4 25.4 12.9 12.4 0.7 1.0 2.4 1.9
US 49.1 48.2 20.4 20.9 19.4 18.9 7.1 7.0 3.9 5.0
This can be interpreted as if the prices transmitted to consumers were updated once a year to
reflect changes in generation costs. The demand schedule is assumed to feature a constant price
elasticity and is calibrated to the benchmark consumer price of electricity pele and to the
benchmark demand d
ele
:
delet = d
ele
t
(
pele
pele
)
(14)
where  < 0 is the regional price elasticity of demand, parameterized with price elasticities shown
in Table 7. Besides econometric estimates based on Bernstein and Griffin (2005), we use
simulated price elasticities that are derived from the economy-wide model, hence providing a
local approximation of general equilibrium demand response. The difference between estimated
and simulated elasticities reflects variations of ceteris paribus assumptions, i.e. while estimated
elasticities describe the slope of a given demand curve, simulated elasticities incorporate general
equilibrium determinants of demand that affect the slope and location of the demand schedule for
a given change in price.
The third response of the system occurs through changes on the fuel markets, with fuel prices
responding to changes in the choice of the generation technologies. Defining the demand for fuel
z as:
d z =
∑
g,t
γgeleg,zt , (15)
we assume a set of constant elasticity supply schedules calibrated to the benchmark fuel price and
demand, so that the inverse supply function is:
pz = pz
(
d z
d
z
) 1
ηz
(16)
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Table 7. Regional Price Elasticities for Fuel Supply and Electricity Demand.
Region Electricity demand elasticities Fuel supply elasticities: Simulated values b
Econometric estimates a Simulated values b Coal Natural gas
(ˆr) (˜r) (η˜coalr ) (η˜
natural gas
r )
CA -0.25 -0.47 0.01 0.02
ERCOT -0.15 -0.43 0.01 0.04
MISO -0.14 -0.24 0.03 0.01
MOUNT -0.20 -0.37 0.01 0.02
NENGL -0.19 -0.72 0.01 0.01
NWPP -0.23 -0.43 0.09 0.01
NY -0.10 -0.17 0.01 0.01
PJM -0.22 -0.23 0.04 0.01
SEAST -0.25 -0.32 0.05 0.01
SPP -0.15 -0.50 0.01 0.01
Notes: aEconometric estimates from Bernstein and Griffin (2005), point estimates averaged across end-use demands.
bSimulated from the USREP model.
where ηzr > 0 is the regional supply price elasticity for fuel z. We include a supply function as in
(16) for coal and natural gas as for these fuels certain regions are characterized by large market
shares. The local price elasticities are simulated from the economy-wide model and reported in
Table 7. Overall, the change in the demand from the electricity sector has a relatively small
impact on the market price for coal, and an even smaller impact on the natural gas market. For all
other fuels, the electricity sector is assumed to be a price-taker, i.e. ηz =∞.
3. RECONCILING TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP
Our integrated framework comprises the following two sub-models: (1) the economy-wide
USREP model with exogenous electricity generation that is parameterized with the benchmark
input demand from the bottom-up model, and (2) the bottom-up load-dispatch electricity model
with electricity demand and fuel supply functions locally calibrated with top-down quantities and
prices.12 We use a block decomposition algorithm based on Boehringer and Rutherford (2009) to
solve the two modules consistently. The algorithm involves an iterative procedure between both
sub-models solving for a mutually consistent general equilibrium response in both sub-models.
A schematic overview of the steps is presented in Figure 3. The first step (grey shaded box)
for implementing the decomposition procedure by Boehringer and Rutherford (2009) in an
12 In principle, a bottom-up representation of the electricity sector can be integrated directly within a general equilib-
rium framework by solving Kuhn-Tucker equilibrium conditions, that arise from the bottom-up cost-minimization
problem, along with general equilibrium conditions describing the top-down model (Boehringer and Rutherford,
2008). In applied work, this approach is infeasible due to the large dimensionality of the bottom-up problem. More-
over, the bottom-up model involves a large number of bounds on decision variables, and the explicit representation
of associated income effects becomes intractable if directly solved within a general equilibrium framework.
16
applied large-scale setting is the calibration of the two models to a consistent benchmark. Initial
agreement in the benchmark is achieved if benchmark bottom-up electricity sector outputs and
inputs over all regions and generators are consistent with the aggregate representation of the
electricity sector in the SAM data that underlies the general equilibrium framework. This step is
necessary to ensure that in the absence of a policy shock iterating between both sub-models
always returns the no-policy benchmark equilibrium. Violation of this initial condition means that
any simulated policy effects would be confounded with adjustments triggered by initial data
inconsistencies between the two sub-models.
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Figure 3. Iterative Steps in Decomposition Algorithm.
To produce a micro-consistent benchmark data that integrates the disaggregated electricity
sector, we apply a two-step procedure that (1) generates bottom-up data from a no-policy solution
of the bottom-up model that is benchmarked to macroeconomic electricity demand, and that (2)
accommodates bottom-up electricity data by adjusting the SAM data subject to equilibrium
consistency constraints. Appendix B provides a detailed description of the steps involved.
Turning to the solution algorithm, each iteration comprises two steps. Step 1 solves a
simplified version of the top-down model with exogenous electricity production where electricity
sector output and input demands are parameterized based on the previous solution of the
bottom-up model. The subsequent solution of the bottom-up electricity model in Step 2 is based
on a locally calibrated set of linear demand functions for electricity. The key insight from
Boehringer and Rutherford (2009) is that a Marshallian demand approximation in the electricity
sector provides a good local representation of general equilibrium demand, and that rapid
convergence is observed as the electricity sector is small relative to the rest of the economy. We
find that convergence speed can be increase further if a linear approximation of fuel supply is
included in the bottom-up model that is successively re-calibrated on the basis of top-down
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equilibrium fuel prices.
The following subsections provide a formal description of the decomposition technique based
on the notation developed in Section 2 and discuss the convergence behavior of the algorithm.
3.1 Formulation of the Integrated Model
We first turn to the specification of the economy-wide component in the integrated model. Let
n = 1, . . . , N denote an iteration index. Electricity supply in the economy-wide model is
exogenous and hence zero-profit conditions for the electricity generation activities and
resource-specific market clearance can be dropped (equations 1, 2 and 8). Furthermore, the
least-cost input requirement determined by solving the bottom-up model in iteration (n− 1) are
used to parameterize the economy-wide model in (n) by replacing equations (3) to (7) with a set
of modified market clearance conditions:∑
g,z,t
eleg,zt
(n−1)
= DELE(n) ⊥ P ELE(n) (3′)
Sj
(n)
= Dj
(n)
+
∑
g,z,t
φjgc
g eleg,zt
(n−1) ⊥ P j(n) , ∀j (4′)
L(n) = DL
(n)
+
∑
g,z,t
φLg c
g eleg,zt
(n−1) ⊥ PL(n) (5′)
∑
r
Kr
(n) =
∑
r
(
DKr
(n)
+
∑
g,z,t
φKg c
g eleg,zt
(n−1)
)
⊥ PK (n) (6′)
Sz(n) = Dz(n) + d z(n−1) ⊥ P z(n) (7′)
where φ’s denote the benchmark value share of capital, labor, and materials of variable O&M
costs.13 In addition, we modify the income balance (9) to include technology-specific rents
arising from the limited capacity determined in iteration (n− 1):
M (n) = PK
(n)
K + PL
(n)
L +
∑
g,z,t
eleg,zt
(n−1)
(
P ELE
(n)
pwst
(n−1) − cgP c(n) − pzP z(n)γg
)
. (9′)
where the price of fuel z is defined using the mapping shown in Table 4, and the price for variable
O&M costs is a composite index defined as P c(n) =
∑
j φjP
j(n) + φLP
L(n) + φKP
K (n). Note
13 Transmission and distribution costs are assumed to add in a Leontief fashion to the marginal value of electricity
(P ELE) as determined by (3′).
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that in this approach the electricity-sector output and inputs are valued at market prices, and hence
we do not need to include capacity rents explicitly in the economy-wide model.
In the second step of the algorithm, the bottom-up demand and fuel supply schedules are
linearized to locally approximate the demand response from the top-down model with simulated
elasticity parameters r and ηzr . More specifically, the second step in iteration n involves
re-calibrating the linear functions based on price and quantities derived from the top-down
solution:
delet
(n)
= d
ele
t
(n)
(
1 + 
[
pele
(n)
pele
(n)
− 1
])
. (14′)
Input prices in the bottom-up model are updated with candidate general equilibrium prices from
the economy-wide model. Fuel prices are scaled with the corresponding top-down price index:
pz(n) = pz(0)P z(n) ,
and the fuel supply schedule is re-calibrated with updated price and quantity information from
iteration (n− 1):14
pz(n) = pz(n)
{
1 +
[
1
ηz
(
d z(n)
d z(n−1)
− 1
)]}
. (16′)
Finally, the variable cost index is updated according to :
pc(n) =
∑
j
φjP
j(n) + φLP
L(n) + φKP
K (n) . (17′)
The profit function in iteration n of the bottom-up model is thus given by:
cgpc(n) + pz(n)γg + µ gt ≥ pwst (n) ⊥ eleg,zt (n) ≥ 0 . (10′)
Additional complexity arises from the fact that demand in the top-down model is defined on an
annual basis whereas the bottom-up model distinguishes demand by season and load time. We
reconcile both concepts by scaling intra-annual reference demand and price in the bottom-up
model using the top-down index from iteration (n):
d
ele
t
(n)
= DELE(n)d
ele
t
(0)
pele
(n)
= P ELE
(n)
pele
(0)
where d
ele
t
(0)
and pele(0) denote the no-policy benchmark value of electricity demand and the
consumer price, respectively.
14 The demand for fuel is not scaled due to the lack of an appropriate scaling variable from the top-down model, and
we use the fuel demand from the previous iteration as the initial calibration point.
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Figure 4. Convergence in Regional Consumer Price of Electricity.
3.2 Convergence Performance
This section provides evidence on the convergence performance of the solution algorithm.
Overall we find that despite the complexity and dimensionality in both modules, the algorithm is
robust and provides rapid convergence provided a good local approximation of demand elasticity
is used to parameterize the bottom-up demand. Our convergence metric terminates the algorithm
if the maximum deviation in decision variables between two successive iterations is less than one
percent. Figure 4 reports the percentage change in the consumer price of electricity following a
$50 carbon tax across regions between two successive iterations. The largest adjustments take
place in the first iteration, and for most regions, subsequent iterations of the algorithm only
involve refinements of the supply system, resulting in much smaller changes in relative prices.
For this particular policy shock, the algorithm achieves convergence after six iterations, and up to
eight iterations were required for a carbon tax of $100. Figure 5 shows the convergence in other
top-down quantities (both in physical and value terms) and prices for the PJM region. Overall,
convergence in input prices is rapid, with the price of coal requiring the largest adjustments.
Some additional remarks are in order. First, it is important to note the algorithm is robust with
respect to the parametrization of the elasticities, and the final equilibrium allocation is
independent of the chosen values. Our computational experience suggests that the algorithm
always converged for values smaller than those obtained by simulation; for much higher values,
some regions failed to achieved convergence. Second, we find that providing a good
approximation of the top-down response through simulated elasticities is important to reduce the
number of iterations needed for convergence. In particular, approximating the top-down response
through fuel supply elasticities improves the convergence speed. Lastly, we find that it is
sufficient to evaluate price elasticities of electricity demand at the initial equilibrium, and then use
these values for subsequent iterations. In other words, convergence speed could not significantly
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Figure 5. Convergence in Decision Variables.
be improved by evaluating elasticities at each iteration.
4. ELECTRICITY SECTORMODELING AND THE COST OF CARBON ABATEMENT
This section examines the implications of top-down and bottom-up approaches to electricity
sector modeling for the assessment of economy-wide carbon policies. We explore the sensitivity
to different structural assumptions concerning electricity supply and demand by using a suite of
models that share common technological features and are calibrated to the same benchmark
equilibrium. The virtue of our integrated framework is that it can be used as a benchmark against
which we can compare different versions of the stand-alone top-down and bottom-up models.
Our counterfactual imposes a national tax on CO2 emissions in all regions and sectors of the
economy.15 We consider several tax levels: $25, $50, $75, and $100 per metric ton of CO2 (in
2006$). Throughout our analysis, we require revenue-neutrality by holding back a fraction of the
revenue to offset losses in conventional (non-CO2) tax revenue. Carbon revenue is returned as a
lump-sum transfer to households on a per-capita basis.16
To motivate our analysis, we begin by assessing the size of emissions reductions in the
electricity sector vis-a`-vis other sectors and the general equilibrium impacts on factor and fuel
markets. Table 8 reports sectoral benchmark emissions, reductions, and factor and fuel price
changes from the integrated model. In the benchmark, emissions from the electric power sector
represent about 40% of total emissions. For carbon prices higher than $50, the electricity sector
15 Given the absence of uncertainty in our framework, an equivalent policy with the same environmental stringency
could be implemented as a national cap-and-trade system.
16 We do not attempt to approximate allocation rules that have been proposed by specific U.S. climate legislation but
rather want to make the point that any comprehensive analysis needs to take into account the value of allowances.
21
Table 8. Integrated Model: Emissions Reductions and Price Impacts (% Change from BAU).
Tax level $25 $50 $75 $100
CO2 emissions reduction
Benchmark emissions (mmt)
Agriculture 58.3 -18.0 -24.1 -28.1 -31.4
Services 172.3 -20.2 -33.0 -42.8 -49.9
Energy-intensive products 605.9 -19.4 -30.3 -38.4 -44.4
Other industries products 157.5 -21.4 -34.7 -44.2 -51.1
Transportation 2029.7 -6.4 -11.9 -16.5 -20.5
Electricity 2365.0 -9.8 -32.2 -54.0 -66.5
Price change
Wage ratea -0.4 -1.0 -1.8 -2.5
Capital rental rate -0.5 -1.4 -2.4 -3.2
Coala (producer price) -1.2 -5.9 -12.4 -18.0
Natural gasa (producer price) -1.7 -1.2 0.3 1.4
Welfare change -0.1 -0.4 -0.9 -1.3
aAverage change across regions.
yields the largest emissions reductions in absolute terms.
Changes in factor and fuel prices are substantial, with the capital rental and wage rate
decreasing by -0.5% to -3.2% depending on the level of the carbon tax. Likewise, impacts on fuel
prices exclusive of the carbon charge are significant, with a drop in the producer price of coal
ranging from -1.2% to -18%. The producer price of gas increases slightly for higher carbon tax
levels as the substitution from coal to gas increases demand. As a measure of economic costs, we
report welfare change measured in equivalent variation as a percentage of full income.17 Carbon
price of $25 and $100 bring about welfare losses of about 0.1% and 1.3%, respectively.
Figure 6 shows the fuel mix in electricity generation derived from the bottom-up component
of the integrated model. The key result is the gradual substitution from coal to natural gas.18 For a
$25 carbon price, we observe a reduction in all technologies using fossil fuels. A small number of
generators using coal with a high carbon content switch to use other types of coal or alternative
energy sources. Fuel switching represents a significant flexibility mechanism which is reflected
by a decline in the carbon intensity of coal generation of about 10%. As the carbon price
increases, the change in relative fuel prices gradually makes natural gas generation more
competitive compared to coal-fired generation. The decline in coal-based generation is therefore
partly compensated by an increased utilization rate of the generators using natural gas. Overall, a
$25 carbon price induces a reduction of electricity consumption by about 10%, a $50 price yields
a 20% reduction, while for a price of $100, demand declines by about 30%.
17 Full income is the value of consumption, leisure, and the consumption stream from residential capital.
18 Since carbon-neutral technologies (mainly nuclear and hydro) operate close to capacity in the benchmark, generation
from these ‘must run’ technologies does not expand.
22
 Nuclear 
Natural Gas 
Coal 
Hydro 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
0 25 50 75 100
G
e
n
e
ra
ti
o
n
 (
TW
h
)
Carbon Tax (2006 $/metric ton CO2)
BIT
LIG
SC
SUB
WC
BFG
NG
OG
PG
DFO
JF
KER
RFO
AB
OB
BLQ
GEO
WAT
LFG
MSW
NUC
PC
OWH
SUN
WDS
WND
Figure 6. Electricity Generation by Fuel from the Integrated Model for Different Carbon Prices.
4.1 A Comparison of Partial and General Equilibrium Analysis
We first examine the reliability of partial equilibrium analysis as an approximate solution
technique for assessing the impact of changes in the electricity sector. In our setting, there are two
channels through which general equilibrium factors affect the bottom-up electricity model: (i)
income and substitution effects that determine the location and slope of the electricity demand
schedule, and (ii) fuel prices that influence generation costs. Note that in the partial equilibrium
setting, the electricity sector model optimizes along a given demand curve and assumes constant
fuel prices.
Table 9 reports changes in regional wholesale electricity prices (net of transmission and
distribution costs) and demand reductions for a $50 carbon tax. We contrast results from the
integrated GE model with three different versions of the PE bottom-up model:
• PE model parameterized with econometric estimates of the price elasticity of demand (ˆr),
in column (1),
• PE model with price elasticities of demand simulated from the GE model (˜r), in column
(2),
• PE model with price elasticities of demand simulated from the GE model (˜r) and fuel
supply schedules parameterized with elasticities for coal and natural gas simulated from
the GE model (η˜zr), in column (3).
Not surprisingly, a $50 carbon tax leads to substantial increases in regional electricity prices
across all models. Since the carbon tax is reflected in the electricity price through the carbon
intensity of the marginal generator, the key driver for regional variations in price increases is the
relative generation cost of the marginal fuel in the pre- and after-tax equilibrium. MISO, for
example, has a large stock of efficient coal-fired plants and faces relatively low benchmark coal
prices, making coal the marginal technology across all load blocks. The $50 carbon price does not
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Table 9. Partial (PE) and General Equilibrium (GE) Estimates of Regional Electricity Prices and Demands
for a $50 Carbon Tax.
Region PE electricity model GE model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimated demand Simulated demand Simulated demand Endogenous general
elasticitiesa elasticities and no elasticities and equilibrium response
fuel price responseb fuel price responsec
Change in electricity price (in % relative to BAU)
MISO 77.9 75.3 75.0 67.0
MOUNT 52.4 51.0 51.3 49.4
PJM 53.8 53.6 53.5 43.6
NWPP 43.3 40.1 39.4 37.9
CA 39.8 35.7 35.4 31.0
ERCOT 39.0 33.4 33.3 29.8
SEAST 41.4 36.2 36.4 28.9
SPP 47.0 46.0 45.7 28.3
NENGL 31.9 28.5 28.4 26.6
NY 33.3 33.0 32.9 25.3
Change in electricity demand (in % relative to BAU)
MISO -7.8 -12.4 -12.4 -25.8
MOUNT -8.1 -14.0 -14.1 -16.3
PJM -9.0 -9.2 -9.2 -17.9
NWPP -7.9 -13.4 -13.2 -21.2
CA -8.0 -13.3 -13.2 -17.9
ERCOT -5.1 -12.3 -12.4 -14.7
SEAST -9.2 -11.3 -11.2 -14.5
SPP -4.8 -13.2 -13.2 -17.8
NENGL -5.1 -16.5 -16.5 -20.0
NY -2.8 -4.7 -4.7 -11.4
US -7.8 -11.7 -11.6 -18.1
Notes: aPE model with estimated price elasticities for electricity demand (ˆr) and exogenous fuel prices (ηzr = ∞).
bPE model with simulated price elasticities for electricity demand (˜r) and exogenous fuel prices (ηzr =∞). cSimiliar
to (b) but PE model here also includes constant-elasticity fuel supply schedules for coal and gas with simulated supply
price elasticities (η˜zr ).
lead to a significant reordering of technologies in the supply schedule, and the price increase is
the largest among all regions. In MOUNT and PJM, coal is also the predominant marginal fuel in
the benchmark, but generation from natural gas expands significantly under the carbon tax,
therefore mitigating the price increase. Regions such as CA, ERCOT, NENGL, and NY are
characterized by a relatively large share of natural gas in the benchmark, and they experience
relatively modest price increases.
Comparing projected electricity prices from the PE models and the integrated GE model, it is
evident that the PE models suggest higher price increases. The main reason for this is that the PE
models do not capture shifts and changes in the slope of the electricity demand schedule. Indeed,
reduced income due to lower factor prices and substitution away from electricity towards other
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 Figure 7. Model Comparison of U.S. CO2 Emissions Reductions from Electricity Generation for $50 Carbon
Tax (relative to BAU).
goods and services induce a structural change in electricity demand rather than a movement along
the demand schedule. The PE model based on econometrically estimated elasticities generates the
largest price increases. Differences with the integrated GE framework range from around 3% for
MOUNT to 20% for SPP. When using simulated price elasticities that locally approximate the
demand response of the GE model, the PE estimates for all regions are somewhat closer to those
from the GE case. Including a fuel supply response in the PE model has only a minor effect,
reflecting the small impact of the electricity sector on the markets for coal and natural gas.
While overall price differences across models are relatively modest, the step function
representation for supply implies that shifts in the demand are not necessarily reflected in price
changes.19 In fact, demand reduction suggested by the PE models (see bottom panel of Table 8)
grossly underestimate the change in demand suggested by the general equilibrium framework.
Averaged across all regions, the PE models estimate demand reductions that are 35% to 58%
smaller than the GE estimate. At the regional level, and across different PE models, estimates are
13% to 75% lower than those from the GE case.
Figure 7 provides a comparison of PE and GE models in terms of country-wide emissions
reductions from the electricity sector. The pattern of emissions reductions for the three different
PE models (columns 1-3) and the integrated model (column 4) mirrors the pattern of electricity
demand reductions. Thus, for the purpose of approximating emissions reductions, a PE approach
19 Moreover, the price signal is a weighted average over different time periods, which further tends to smooth out
intra-annual price differences.
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can be a poor tool. To further explore the scope and magnitude of GE effects, we run two
additional versions of the integrated GE model where we do not recycle the carbon revenue
(column 5), and where, in addition, input prices to the electricity sector are kept constant (column
6). In both cases, emissions reductions are slightly larger compared to (4) as reduced income
lowers consumer demand and keeping input price constant implies higher generation costs.
Overall, Figure 7 suggests that economy-wide income and substitution effects on electricity
demand are of first-order importance. Comparing the ‘simple’ PE model (3) with the full GE
model (4), we find that emissions reductions are 38% larger in the GE case. Evaluated at a carbon
price of $50 per metric ton, this is equivalent to $17.7 billion worth of carbon revenue (or
allowance value).
In summary then, the different parameterizations of the PE model seem to provide unreliable
approximations of general equilibrium projections. If the goal is to approximate price changes,
the performance of the PE framework can be improved if price elasticities are based on a local
approximation of the GE model. However, PE analysis uniformly diverges with regard to changes
in the electricity demand and CO2 emissions.
4.2 Top-Down and Bottom-Up Technology Representation and the Cost of Carbon Abate-
ment
This section explores the implications of top-down and bottom-up approaches to electricity
sector modeling for the assessment of CO2 mitigation policy. We consider three versions of the
model outlined in Section 2 :
• GE model with top-down representation of electricity generation, based on nesting
structure (a),
• GE model with top-down representation of electricity generation, based on nesting
structure (b),
• GE model with integrated bottom-up representation of electricity generation.
All three models are benchmarked to the same fuel mix in electricity generation, so that any
differences in the model response can be attributed to the specific structural technology
representation.
Figure 8 shows U.S. electricity generation from coal and natural gas for different carbon
prices.20 For a carbon price of $25, the bottom-up representation suggests a decline in generation
from coal and natural gas. This is mainly due to a demand reduction, as the small change in
relative generation costs has almost no influence on the ordering of technologies in the supply
schedule. In contrast, with either top-down representation, coal generation sharply decreases and
generation from natural gas slightly increases. This effect is a consequence of using aggregate
20 We focus on the change in fossil fuel generation, and in particular on the substitution between coal and natural gas,
because (i) the shares of nuclear and hydro remain almost constant and (ii) other fuels have relatively small market
shares.
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Figure 8. Top-down vs. Bottom-up Comparison of U.S. Electricity Generation from Coal and Natural Gas.
CES functions to characterize electricity generation, as changes in relative fuel prices trigger a
movement along the smooth production possibility frontier even for low tax levels. Furthermore,
in the top-down approach the price of electricity reflects the total carbon content of generation, so
that the demand response is larger than in the bottom-up approach.
For carbon prices above $25, the differences in the substitution pattern persist. The bottom-up
version predicts that coal-fired generation declines steadily while electricity from natural gas
gradually expands with an increasing carbon price. The distinct increase in electricity generated
from gas is possible because all regions have idle generation capacity for natural gas. In contrast,
the two top-down models show a virtually constant generation from natural gas, while the decline
in coal-fired electricity gradually flattens out. The main driver of this effect is a low elasticity of
substitution between coal and gas preventing a significant increase in the generation from natural
gas.21
A key aspect of top-down models is that the nesting structure and elasticity parameters are
typically identical across regions while the response of the integrated model depends on the
benchmark fuel costs and stock of available generation technologies. Figure 9 reports differences
between models in regional emissions reductions for a $50 carbon price. Averaged across all
regions, emissions reductions in the integrated model are 23% and 31% lower than under the
top-down representations (a) and (b), respectively. Differences in emissions reductions are most
striking in regions with a large share of coal-fired generation (SPP, PJM, SEAST, and MOUNT),
21 Both top-down approaches produce relatively similar substitution patterns, but the decline in coal-based generation
is more pronounced for nesting structure (b) relative to (a). The latter assumes a smaller elasticity of substitution
between energy and material inputs.
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Figure 9. Model Comparison of Regional CO2 Emissions Reductions for a $50 Carbon Tax (All Sectors).
for which the top-down models suggest large emissions reductions.22 Regions using a larger share
of natural gas generation in the benchmark (CA, NENGL, NY, and ERCOT) have similar
emissions reductions for all modeling approaches. Note also that, among the two top-down
models, differences in emissions reductions are largest in regions using a large share of coal in the
benchmark, illustrating the sensitivity of the parametrization in top-down nesting structures.
Figure 10 shows the U.S. welfare cost and emissions reductions for the three models. Each
locus has one marker for each carbon price level ($25, $50, $75, and $100) and thus provides a
mapping between emissions reductions and welfare costs for the different modeling frameworks.
The advantage of this graphical presentation is that policy costs across different models can be
compared for the same environmental impacts.
For economy-wide abatement levels below 10%, results from the three models are virtually
identical. For a 20% abatement level, welfare costs from the bottom-up approach are about 40%
and 60% higher than those from the top-down structure (a) and (b), respectively. For higher
abatement levels, the welfare difference between bottom-up and top-down approaches is even
more pronounced. Furthermore, the marginal abatement costs (as measured by the carbon price)
for a given emissions reduction differ widely across models. A $75 carbon tax imposed under the
top-down structure (b) yields a welfare cost of about -0.8% and a decline in emissions of 40%.
For the bottom-up approach and the top-down nesting structure (a), the same carbon abatement
level would be achieved with a carbon price of $100, which is associated with a welfare cost of
-1.2%, a difference in welfare cost of about 50%. Differences between the bottom-up approach
22 The only exception is MISO, where the integrated model suggest a very large increase of generation costs and in turn
a large demand reduction (see Table 9).
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Figure 10. Model Comparison of Welfare Costs and Emissions Reductions for U.S.
and the top-down structure (b) are smaller, especially for emissions reductions above 30%.
At the regional level, we report results for three representative regions to illustrate the large
heterogeneity across model outcomes even though the benchmark data is the same (Figure 11).
First, the solid lines for ERCOT are almost identical across models, as they all suggest a large
decline in coal-fired generation and a small increase in natural gas—most of the abatement here is
driven by the demand response. This situation is similar for MISO. Second, NENGL generates
little electricity from coal, and the top-down representation suggests much higher abatement costs
in the electricity sector, as compared to the bottom-up representation. This situation is similar for
CA, NY and NWPP.23 Finally, SPP has a large share of coal in the benchmark, and the bottom-up
approach suggests that generation from natural gas expands. Here, abatement costs in the
electricity sector are higher under the bottom-up representation. This situation is similar for PJM,
SEAST and MOUNT.
Two general conclusions can be drawn from this model comparison. First, the choice of
bottom-up or top-down technology representation for the electricity sector has a large effect on
the estimated cost and environmental effects of carbon policies. The differences implied by these
structural assumptions would seem to go beyond the model uncertainty that is typically borne out
by parametric sensitivity analysis. Second, given the significant discrepancies across model
outcomes, in particular at the regional level, our analysis reveals the difficulty in parameterizing a
top-down technology representation of the electricity sector. While simulating elasticities from a
bottom-up model may be one potential avenue to address this issue, approximating the
multi-dimensional and discontinuous response of a bottom-up model by means of highly
23 Note that for a $25 carbon price, the integrated model suggests a positive welfare impact for NENGL which is due
to the redistribution of allowances.
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Figure 11. Model Comparison of Welfare Costs and Emissions Reductions for Selected Regions.
aggregated substitution elasticities is a challenging task. Moreover, this would require structural
accordance of the bottom-up and top-down models in terms of key model dimensions such as, for
example, regional configuration and input structure. Finally, conceptual differences between the
two model paradigms with respect to the transmission of the carbon price would be difficult to
reconcile.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Large-scale numerical models have become a popular and widespread tool to assess the
economic implications of climate and energy policies. While the virtue of top-down models is
their representation of general equilibrium effects, a major source of critiques is their reliance on
smooth aggregate production functions to describe the technology choice in the electric power
sector. In contrast, bottom-up models have a rich technological underpinning but typically do not
account for general equilibrium effects. By developing an integrated benchmark model that
embeds a bottom-up technology representation of the electricity sector within a multi-sector
general equilibrium framework, we generate numerical evidence on (1) the importance of general
equilibrium effects for partial equilibrium bottom-up models of the electricity sector, and (2) the
implications of top-down versus bottom-up representations of electric generation technologies for
assessing the cost and environmental effects of CO2 control policies.
In the context of U.S. climate policy, our numerical analysis suggests that the general
equilibrium effects and the mode of representation of electricity technologies are of crucial
importance for estimating electricity prices and demand, carbon abatement potentials, and welfare
costs. Moreover, the elasticity parameters needed for a reduced-form model response are difficult
to estimate from empirical data, for two reasons. First, general equilibrium effects associated with
carbon policies are complex and difficult to identify from historic data. Second, the discrete and
temporal nature of electricity generation is difficult to represent by means of aggregate
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substitution possibilities among various electric power technologies. Our analysis therefore
suggests that integrating a bottom-up electricity sector model into a general equilibrium
framework provides an attractive structural alternative for ex-ante policy modeling.
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APPENDIXA: Integrated Electricity Regions
Figure A1. Overview of U.S. Electric Power Markets (Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
2010)
APPENDIXB: Data Reconciliation and Model Calibration
This appendix outlines our approach to calibrate both components of the integrated model to a
common benchmark that is based on historical data for the year 2006 and that satisfies general
equilibrium conditions. The involved steps are as follows:
1. Benchmarking of bottom-up electricity sector model.
The initial step involves benchmarking the bottom-up model to observed physical
electricity demand by region. Let Q¯ELEr denote benchmark demand by region (in
MwH) that is consistent with the augmented Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) data
underlying the USREP model.24 Solving a version of the bottom-up model that
comprises equations (10) through (12) (hence dropping equations (13) through (16) to
suppress demand and fuel supply responses), and that parameterizes electricity
demand in equation (14) according to deler,t = Q¯
ELE
r
y¯r,t∑
t′ y¯r,t′
(hence effectively sharing
24 Economic data in the form of a Social Accounting Matrix is typically in units of dollars. The USREP model is based
on augmented SAM data that merges together economic data from IMPLAN and physical energy data from EIA’s
State Energy Data System.
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out aggregate demand based on observed reference output y¯r,t), yields a vector of
cost-minimizing outputs and inputs that is consistent with meeting observed demand,
given generation costs and capacity constraints.
2. Benchmarking of top-down general equilibrium model.
(a) Reconciliating bottom-up generation costs and top-down demand. Let Gr denote
total generation costs that are defined as an output-weighted average of generation
costs as defined in equation (13), i.e. Gr =
∑
t p
ele
r d
ele
r,t. The discrepancy between
bottom-up generation costs and top-down user costs of electricity is reconciled by
imputing transmission and distribution costs (TDr) in each region as:
TDr = D¯ELEr − G¯r. We further assume that T&D costs are denominated in terms of
capital, labor, and materials, and apply residual cost shares from IMPLAN data to
determine individual cost components.
(b) Mapping bottom-up electricity inputs to commodity accounts in SAM. Having
reconciled electricity output in physical and value terms, the remaining steps involve
integrating cost-minimizing input demands into the SAM data such that general
equilibrium conditions are satisfied, i.e. the resulting SAM data is micro-consistent
and can be used to calibrate the CGE model. First, we need to determine how various
electricity sector inputs costs are mapped to commodity accounts in the SAM data.
More specifically, we assume that variable O&M costs are composed of capital, labor,
and materials costs, where cost shares are based on IMPLAN data for the electricity
sector. Due to lack of more disaggregated data, we assumed that cost shares are
uniform across generators in a given region. Disaggregated fuel categories from the
bottom-up model are mapped to the CGE commodity structure as shown in Table 4.
We map fuels and other goods demands derived from electricity production in the
bottom-up model to import (intra-national and foreign) and domestic demand in the
SAM data according to benchmark IMPLAN shares, and adjust trade flows to ensure
that domestic trade is balanced. This preserves the value share of imported inputs into
the electricity sector. Note that we do not have to adjust electricity trade in the
macroeconomic data, as in the first step the bottom-up model has been benchmarked
to observed electricity demand, and thus implicitly to trade flows. The price of fuels
that do not have direct counterparts in the top-down model are assumed to be
exogenous, and remain constant under policy simulations.
(c) Accounting for capacity rents. Technology-specific rents arise from the limited
capacity for each generator, and make up the difference between the market price and
the unit generation costs of sub-marginal generators. These rents are accounted for in
the economy-wide framework by increasing the capital earnings of households in
proportion to their benchmark capital earnings.
(d) Balancing of Social Accounting Matrix data. Having established a mapping
between electricity inputs and commodities in the SAM data, and given that domestic
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trade is balanced, we finally re-balance the SAM data, one region at a time, holding
trade flows and all electricity variables fixed at their benchmark values. More
specifically, we adjust the value of domestic output, value-added and intermediate
inputs, private demand, and factor income. We use least-square optimization methods
to obtain a balanced SAM matrix for each region that is benchmarked to the no-policy
solution of the bottom-up electricity sector model, consistent with observed trade
flows from IMPLAN data, and that satisfies general equilibrium constraints. Note that
the adjustments necessary to produce a balanced SAM are minor as the size of the
electricity sector (in value terms) compared to the rest of the economy is small,
i.e. less than 4.3% of total income in each region. Based on balanced SAM data, the
calibration of production and consumption technologies using base year data on prices
and quantities is a standard exercise (e.g., Robinson, 1991 or Rutherford, 1999), and
hence needs no further discussion.
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